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Why the Iran conflict could be decided between Hormuz and Suez
The Iran conflict is more than just a regional war. It is a race against time and for the most sensitive pinholes of the global economy. But the real battlefield is not in the Iranian desert – it is on the trade routes of the global economy. The coming weeks will decide whether the crisis between Hormuz and Suez escalates or whether a geopolitical chapter comes to an end.
These days, the world is looking at the Persian Gulf with bated breath. Since the start of Operation Epic Fury on February 28, we have been in the midst of a high-speed geopolitical scenario that could change the rules of the game for the last forty years within a matter of weeks.
But while many observers mainly see chaos and escalation, a closer look reveals a different picture: a strategic race against time – with a possible outcome that, paradoxically enough, could even give rise to cautious optimism.
The race against time
The military logic of this conflict is currently brutally simple: it is a race between the destructive power of the air strikes and the endurance of the Iranian missile and drone infrastructure.
The critical element here is not so much the sheer firepower as the depth of the defensive magazines. Modern air defense is effective – but it is expensive and finite. Every intercepted cruise missile or drone consumes resources that cannot be replaced as quickly as required. This is where the time window of around three weeks that currently plays a role in military planning arises.
If it is possible to weaken Iran’s launch capabilities within this phase to such an extent that larger coordinated waves of attacks are no longer possible, the situation will probably stabilize in a form of limited military control.
However, if this does not succeed, an unpleasant strategic situation will arise. The USA and its allies could then be left with only two options at some point: a strategic withdrawal – or the deployment of ground troops.
Both would be extremely difficult politically.
The pincers: Hormuz and Suez
However, the real battlefield of this conflict is not just in the Iranian desert, but on the trade routes of the global economy. We are currently experiencing a classic geopolitical pincer movement.
On one side is the Strait of Hormuz, through which around a fifth of global oil trade flows. On the other side is the Red Sea with access to the Suez Canal, which connects around 12-15 percent of global trade.
Iran has an asymmetric strategy. It does not have to close these routes completely – it is enough to make them credibly unsafe.
This problem is particularly evident in the Strait of Hormuz. Even if Western navies retain military control of the sea area, a single successful attack on a large tanker or a credible mine threat is theoretically enough to persuade insurance companies and shipping companies to withdraw.
In practice, therefore, “keeping open” does not necessarily mean normal trade. It often only means that military escorted convoys are possible – while civilian market traffic is already declining significantly.
This psychological dimension makes Hormuz one of the most dangerous bottlenecks in the world.
The Strait of Hormuz is one of the most important bottlenecks in the global economy. A shipping route just a few kilometers wide runs between Iran and Oman, through which around a fifth of the global oil trade is transported. Dozens of tankers pass through this passage every day.
However, the strategic problem lies not only in the amount of oil transported, but also in the geographical situation: some of the shipping routes are only a few kilometers away from the Iranian coast. This means that mobile missile positions, drones, speedboats or sea mines can be enough to massively disrupt traffic, at least temporarily.
Iran therefore does not have to block the road completely. It is enough to make it credibly unsafe so that insurance companies and shipping companies reduce traffic. Even individual attacks can trigger global price shocks.
The second front in the Red Sea
At the same time, there is a second line of pressure in the south. With their missile and drone capabilities, the Houthi militias in Yemen indirectly control access to the Bab-el-Mandeb bottleneck, which connects the Red Sea with the Indian Ocean.
If this route were to become permanently unsafe, many merchant ships would have to take a detour around Africa – a logistical nightmare for global trade. This would dramatically increase the economic pressure on Europe and Asia.
The Houthi militias are very difficult to defeat militarily due to the strategic situation in Yemen. The north of the country consists largely of mountainous regions that are difficult to access and have already shown in previous conflicts how difficult military operations can be there. Even technically superior armies have only limited options in this terrain. Ground troops would be associated with enormous risks – a circumstance that provides the Houthi militias with strategic cover.
The second critical point lies a thousand kilometers to the south: the Bab-el-Mandeb bottleneck between Yemen and East Africa. This is where the connection between the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea runs – and therefore access to the Suez Canal.
Around 12 to 15 percent of global trade passes through this route, particularly container traffic between Europe and Asia. If this passage becomes unsafe, ships have to take the long detour around the Cape of Good Hope. This extends transport times by up to two weeks and massively increases the cost of global trade.
The Houthi militias in Yemen have shown in recent years that even isolated drone or missile attacks can be enough to divert large parts of shipping.
Why China suddenly has a red line
This is also where the often invoked neutrality of great powers ends. High oil prices may be geopolitically attractive for Russia. For China, however, the situation is much more complicated. The Chinese export model is heavily dependent on stable trade routes to Europe. A long-term disruption of the connection via Suez and the Red Sea would strike directly at the heart of Chinese industry.
Beijing therefore has a strong interest in stabilizing these routes – even if this means not being able to continue to openly support Iran. In the meantime, the first cautious signals of de-escalation from Beijing are also becoming visible. Although the military actions continue to be criticized, at the same time the willingness to cooperate with Washington is being underlined. For the Chinese leadership, the stability of global trade routes is the main priority.
The common interest of China and the USA
Paradoxically, this creates a rare geopolitical window. Normally, Washington and Beijing are strategically opposed to each other, but in this situation there is an unusual overlap of interests: the US wants a quick political conclusion, China wants stable trade routes. Both speak against a long, open war.
Although this is unlikely to result in active cooperation, it will at least ensure that neither side has any interest in an escalation spiral.
| USA: domestic political time pressure | China: Stability of the global economy |
| For a US president – especially for someone like Donald Trump – three things are crucial: Midterms – The midterm elections will determine whether the president remains politically capable of acting. A long war shortly beforehand would be extremely risky. Gasoline prices – In the USA, gasoline prices are almost an election factor in their own right. A permanent oil price shock through Hormuz would immediately generate domestic political pressure. War fatigue – After Iraq and Afghanistan, the American public is very sensitive to conflicts without a clear end point. This is why Washington needs – at least politically – a clear, relatively quick result that can be sold as a success. | For Xi Jinping, the problem lies elsewhere. China is now more dependent on the global trading system than any other major economy. Two points are particularly critical: Energy imports – A large proportion of China’s oil imports come from the Gulf. Trade routes to Europe – A significant proportion of Chinese exports travel via the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. If this route is disrupted for any length of time, transportation times and costs will increase massively. A prolonged crisis would therefore be extremely unpleasant for Beijing economically. |
In addition to China, several Asian industrialized nations also have an enormous interest in stable trade routes in the Persian Gulf. Japan in particular is extremely vulnerable due to its strong energy dependence on the Middle East. For Tokyo, the security of the Strait of Hormuz is therefore not just a foreign policy issue, but also a question of economic stability.
The underestimated role of the Gulf states
Another decisive factor is the Persian Gulf states themselves.
- Oman has traditionally played the role of discreet mediator between Iran and the West. In many crises, Muscat has been the last functioning channel of communication between the conflicting parties. Should there actually be a diplomatic exit option, it is very likely that this will go through Oman.
- Saudi Arabia is also pursuing its own strategic goals: stabilizing the energy markets. With pipelines to the Red Sea, the country has limited opportunities to partially divert oil transports past the Strait of Hormuz.
- The United Arab Emirates in turn operate Fujairah, one of the most important oil ports outside the Hormuz Passage – a logistical outlet that could play an important role in the event of a crisis.
Together, these countries form a kind of strategic safety net for the global economy.
Possible scenarios for the coming weeks
The further course of the conflict essentially depends on three factors: the military impact of the air strikes, the stability of the trade routes and the political willingness to de-escalate. This results in three possible developments.
| 1. escalation | 2. stabilization | 3. political exit |
| If Iran’s missile and drone capabilities cannot be weakened quickly enough, attacks via Iran itself or via regional proxies could increase. At the same time, greater disruption to shipping in the Persian Gulf or the Red Sea would massively increase economic pressure. In this case, Washington would at some point be faced with a difficult decision: withdrawal – or further escalation. | If the air strikes limit Iran’s attack options more than expected and international naval forces are able to secure the trade routes at the same time, the conflict could turn into a phase of controlled tension. In this case, the global economy would stabilize relatively quickly. | The third scenario would be of a diplomatic nature. Under the pressure of military losses and economic risks, a mediation channel could emerge – for example via Oman or other regional players. Such a solution would allow all sides to end the conflict without officially conceding. |
A “Black Swan” called transition
This leaves the question of Iran’s political future itself. Iran differs from many other crisis states in the Middle East in that it has a relatively strong national identity and state continuity. The danger of complete disintegration, as in Iraq or Libya, is therefore lower. However, this does not mean that a political transition would automatically be stable.
In such a scenario, the decisive factor would be less a single charismatic personality and more the existence of a credible transitional structure behind which different social groups can rally. Such a perspective could be decisive in avoiding chaos in the event of a power vacuum.
In this context, the so-called “100-day plan” of Reza Pahlavi, which outlines a transitional phase after a possible change of power, is also repeatedly referred to. However, whether such an initiative could actually find broad support within Iranian society is just as open as the question of whether Reza Pahlavi would be the right person to lead such a transitional structure.
What could be sold as a “victory”
At the same time, domestic political logic also plays a role in the USA. For Washington – and for President Trump in particular – an open, long-term war would be politically risky. A “victory” would therefore have to be clear, visible and quickly communicable.
The most likely scenario for this would be a combination of three elements:
- the stabilization of the Strait of Hormuz,
- a significant weakening of Iran’s missile and drone capabilities,
- and a diplomatic exit via mediators such as Oman.
Such a combination could possibly be sold politically as a successful demonstration of strength – without risking a protracted ground war.
Conclusion: Courage for cautious optimism
As paradoxical as it sounds, it is precisely the chaotic dynamics of this crisis that could lead to an unusual constellation.
Iran is relatively isolated internationally. The USA and its allies are increasing military pressure. At the same time, the importance of global trade routes is forcing major powers such as China to adopt a stabilizing stance.
Whether the “three-week storm” actually proves to be a turning point in the crisis will soon become clear and then we will know whether this fragile balance leads to a further escalation or to an unexpected turning point.
This conflict will not be decided in the Iranian desert, but on the trade routes of the global economy. There, between Hormuz and Suez, not only will the stability of a region be decided in the coming weeks, but we may also see the end of a geopolitical chapter that has destabilized the world in recent decades. And that, in turn, could mean that in the end, a military engagement that has not really been thought through, without a clear exit strategy, could lead to an outcome that makes the world a somewhat safer place.
